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Abstract 
This paper derives Pareto efficient policy rules for the provision of national as well as global 
public goods in a two-country world, where each individual cares about relative consumption 
within as well as between countries. Furthermore, we compare these policy rules with those 
that follow from a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The results show that both global and 
national public goods are systematically under-provided in Nash equilibrium under such 
relative consumption concerns. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We live in an increasingly globalized world. This is not least true for the environmental 
problem at the top of the political agenda worldwide, global warming, for which it essentially 
does not matter for the environment in a single country where in the world the emissions of 
for example CO2 are released; see, e.g., Stern (2007). It is also true culturally, since only half 
a century ago a large part of the world’s population had only vague perceptions about living 
conditions in other countries than their own whereas today we know much more about our 
fellows in other countries as a result of increased travel and the technological advancements 
of TV and other media.  
 
Arguably, this cultural globalization also has implications for social comparisons. In recent 
years, an economics literature dealing with the importance of relative consumption concerns, 
i.e., that we tend to value not only absolute consumption but also our consumption relative to 
that of others, has grown rapidly, in part influenced by the large corresponding literatures in 
social psychology and sociology. Yet, both the empirical literature on relative consumption 
and well-being
1
 and the (predominantly) theoretical literature dealing with optimal policy-
responses to relative consumption concerns2 have almost exclusively been concerned with 
consumption comparisons within countries, and have hence ignored between-country 
comparisons. Becchetti et al. (2010) constitute a recent exception in the empirical literature. 
Their study examines the determinants of self-reported life satisfaction and is based on survey 
data for Western European countries from 1973 to 2002. By controlling for the determinants 
                                                          
1
 This includes happiness research (e.g., Easterlin, 2001; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005; Luttmer, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2010), questionnaire-based experiments (e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al., 
2002; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007; Corazzini, Esposito and Majorano, forthcoming) and, 
more recently, brain science (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2011). There are also recent evolutionary 
models consistent with relative consumption concerns (Samuelson, 2004; Rayo and Becker, 2007). Stevenson 
and Wolfers (2008) constitute a recent exception in the happiness literature, claiming that the role of relative 
income is overstated. 
2
 See, e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Layard (1980), Ng (1987), Blomquist (1993), Corneo and Jeanne 
(1997, 2001), Ireland (2001), Brekke and Howarth (2002), Abel (2005), Wendner and Goulder (2008), Kanbur 
and Tuomala (2010), Wendner (2010, 2011), and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010, forthcoming). 
Clark et al. (2008) provide a good overview of both the empirical evidence and economic implications of relative 
consumption concerns.  
3 
 
of subjective well-being discussed in earlier literature, such as conventional relative income 
measures (one’s income relative to that observed in reference groups based on education, age, 
and gender) and domestic GDP, the authors find that the distance between the domestic GDP 
and the GDP of the richest country in the data significantly reduces individual life-
satisfaction, and that the importance of such cross-country comparisons has increased over 
time. As such, increased globalization indeed seems to affect the social comparisons inherent 
in subjective well-being.  
 
There is also more indicative evidence. Based on different kinds of evidence, e.g., from the 
sociological literature, James (1987) argues that people in poor countries are most likely 
affected by the consumption in rich countries. Also, Friedman (2005) argues, based on his 
interpretation of available happiness data across countries and over time together with the 
rapidly increased spread of TV and other information technology, that the importance of 
cross-country consumption comparisons most likely increases over time, i.e., in line with the 
evidence presented by Becchetti et al. (2010). Consistent with this (although there are of 
course alternative explanations), Clark and Senik (2010) present evidence based on a recent 
survey of Europeans that respondents who did not have Internet access were less subject to 
income comparisons. Similarly, Clark and Senik (2011) argue in a recent survey of the 
happiness-consumption relationships that if the development of information and 
communication technologies “allow the inhabitants of low-income countries to be aware of 
the life-style and consumption possibilities of high-income country citizens, this is likely to 
generate feelings of relative deprivation.”  
 
 
However, we are not aware of any study dealing with the policy implications of relative 
consumption concerns both within and between countries. The present paper aims at filling 
part of this gap by analyzing the policy incentives underlying public good provision. To be 
more specific, the purpose is to analyze the Pareto efficient provision of national and global 
public goods in a world where people are concerned with relative consumption comparisons 
both with others in their own country and with people in other countries, and also compare the 
policy rules for efficient public provision with those that follow in a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium. As such, the present paper generalizes insights from Ng (1987), Brekke and 
Howarth (2002), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), and Wendner and Goulder (2008), 
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who all study public good provision under relative consumption concerns in the context of 
one-country model economies, to a world with more than one country.  
 
Why is this generalization interesting? First, as we referred to above, evidence suggests that 
between-country comparisons have become increasingly important for individual well-being. 
Yet, there are no earlier studies (at least not to our knowledge) dealing with the policy 
implications of such comparisons. As we will show below, within- as well as between-country 
comparisons affect the incentives underlying the provision of both national and global public 
goods. Second, it is particularly interesting to analyze the efficient provision of global public 
goods in such contexts due to the increased attention paid to global public goods in recent 
decades, where the global climate is the prime example. To implement the efficient provision 
of such public goods in real world economies, the policy incentives facing governments at the 
national level must also be addressed, which further motivates the distinction between the 
Pareto efficient allocation and non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
 
In Section 2, we present the basic model. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, while 
still being able to analyze the main mechanisms, we assume a world with two countries, 
which may or may not be identical. Individuals derive utility from their own consumption of 
private and public goods, where the latter comprise both national and global public goods, as 
well as from their own private consumption relative to that of other people in their own 
country and abroad, respectively. By national public goods, we simply mean public goods 
with no international spillovers, such that people derive utility from these goods solely within 
the country that provides them, whereas global public goods can be benefitted from in all 
countries.  
 
Section 3 presents efficient public good provision rules, with a particular emphasis on the 
elicitation format of people’s marginal willingness to pay (WTP), which is shown to be 
important for how these policy rules are related to the Samuelson condition. These provision 
rules are expressed in terms of degrees of positionality, i.e., the degree to which relative 
consumption matters compared to absolute consumption. Section 4 presents the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium and, in particular, examines the provision of national and global 
public goods in that context. It is concluded that both national and global public goods tend to 
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be under-provided in Nash equilibrium under between-country relative consumption 
concerns. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. The Model – Preferences and Concerns for Relative Consumption 
 
The world consists of two countries, Country 1 and Country 2, each with a fixed population 
equal to n . A representative individual in Country i derives utility from private consumption, 
ic , as well as from the consumption of a national public good, il , and a global public good, 
g . The global public good is, in turn, decomposed as 1 2g g g , where ig  is the 
contribution to the global public good by Country i (but hence enjoyed in both countries). In 
addition, the individual cares about his/her relative consumption of the private good through 
two different comparisons:3  relative consumption with respect to others’ consumption in the 
individual’s own country, ( , )i i i i i iR r c c c c , where ic  is average consumption in 
Country i, and relative consumption with respect to people in the other country, 
( , )i i i j i jS s c c c c , where 
jc  is the average consumption in the other country, j.4 
 
The utility function for an individual in Country i is then given by (for i=1,2) 
                                                          
3
 We follow convention in assuming that the publicly provided goods are completely non-positional. It is, 
nevertheless, possible to extend the model such that the benefits of public goods differ among individuals 
(perhaps due to differences in the access to these goods), and that individuals also care about their relative 
benefits of, or access to, the national public goods. We leave this for future research. 
4
 That relative consumption is defined by the difference between the individual’s own consumption and a 
corresponding measure of reference consumption is the most commonly used specification; see, e.g., Akerlof 
(1997), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Bowles and Park (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), 
and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010, forthcoming). Alternative approaches include ratio 
comparisons (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 1980; Abel, 2005; Wendner and Goulder, 2008) and 
comparisons of ordinal rank (Frank, 1985; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004, 2009). Dupor and Liu (2003) consider 
a specific flexible functional form that includes the difference comparison and ratio comparison approaches as 
special cases. Mujcic and Frijters (in press) compare models based on difference comparisons, ratio comparisons 
and rank-based comparisons, applied on a questionnaire-experimental dataset, without being able to discriminate 
between them. Corazzini et al. (2012) find that absolute differences, and not only rank, matter. Although the 
analytical results presented here will of course depend on the specific form of the consumption comparisons, the 
main mechanisms discussed are present more generally. 
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, , , , , , , ,
(1 ) , , , ,
i i i i i i i i i i j
i i i i i i i i j i
U v c l g R S u c l g c c
V c R S l g V c c c l g
, (1) 
 
where iv , iu , and iV  are twice continuously differentiable and , 0 . The function ( )iv  is 
a general utility formulation based on the difference comparisons described above, whereas 
( )iu  is a convenient reduced form used in some of the calculations below. As mentioned, we 
assume that people care about relative consumption compared to others in their own country 
as well as in the other country, implying that , 0i iR Sv v , which also implies that people’s 
utility will depend negatively on others’ consumption such that , 0i j
i i
c c
u u . Subscripts denote 
partial derivatives.  
 
To simplify, we add some additional structure to the utility functions such that they can be 
written in the form of ( )iV . This implies in particular that the degrees of positionality, to be 
defined below, are the same in both countries, which simplifies the analytical expressions 
considerably without any important loss of generality; the main mechanisms shown are more 
robust and do not depend on these assumptions. Yet, as is evident from equation (1), people in 
different countries need not be identical regarding the underlying income levels, consumption 
levels, or preferences. 
 
Before we derive the efficient provision rules, it will be proved useful to clearly introduce, 
following, e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 
(2008), the concept of degrees of positionality as reflections of the extent by which relative 
consumption matters for utility at the individual level. Yet, since we have two countries here, 
contrary to previous studies, we will have different measures for the extent to which relative 
consumption matters within the country and the extent to which relative consumption matters 
between countries.  
 
Let us define the degree of domestic positionality for each resident in Country i as 
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i i
i R c
i i i i i
c R c S c
v r
v v r v s
, for i=1,2. (2) 
 
The variable i  reflects the fraction of the utility increase from the last dollar consumed by 
residents in Country i that is due to the increased relative consumption compared to others 
within their own country. Due to the form of ( )iV as shown above, it is easy to show that the 
degree of domestic positionality is the same in both countries and equal to in equation (1). 
 
Similarly, we can define the degree of foreign positionality for each resident in Country i as 
 
i
i i i
i i
Si c
i i i i i
R Sc c c
v s
v v r v s
, for i=1,2. (3) 
 
Hence, i  reflects the fraction of the utility increase from the last dollar consumed by 
residents in Country i that is due to the increased relative consumption compared to people in 
the other country. Similar to above, the form of ( )iV implies that also the degree of foreign 
positionality is the same in both countries and equal to  in equation (1). 
 
The total degree of positionality is then correspondingly defined as 
 
i i i , (4) 
 
for i=1,2, meaning that  reflects the fraction of the utility increase from the last dollar 
consumed that is due to the increased relative consumption of any kind, i.e., including 
comparisons with people both within and outside the individual’s own country. Clearly, the 
conventional assumptions in economics, where only absolute consumption matters, are that 
0 . The other extreme case where only relative consumption matters, and hence 
absolute consumption does not matter at all for utility, implies that 1. 
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For simplicity, we also assume a linear technology and perfect competition, implying zero 
profits. The national budget constraint can then be written as (for i=1,2) 
 
i i l i g iy nc p l p g , (5) 
 
where iy  is the gross national income produced in Country i, which is used for private and 
public consumption. The variables lp  and gp  are interpretable in terms of the marginal rate 
of transformation between the associated public good and the private consumption good.  
 
 
3. Pareto Efficient National and Global Public Good Provision 
 
To derive the efficient provision rules, we will maximize utility of individuals in Country 1 
while keeping utility fixed for people in Country 2, subject to an overall resource constraint. 
The corresponding Lagrangean can then be written 
 
21 2 2
1
ˆ i i l i g
i
L U U U y nc p l p g , (6) 
 
where 2Uˆ  is the fixed minimum utility level for residents in Country 2, whereas  and  are 
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the minimum utility restriction and overall resource 
constraint, respectively. The first-order conditions with respect to private consumption in 
Countries 1 and 2, global public good provision, and national public good provision in 
Countries 1 and 2 are given by (if expressed in terms of the function ( )iu  defined in equation 
(1)): 
 
 1 1 1
1 1 2 0
c c c
u u u n , (7) 
 2 2 2
1 2 2 0
c c c
u u u n , (8) 
 
1 2 0gg gu u p , (9) 
 1
1 0l
l
u p , (10) 
  2
2 0l
l
u p . (11) 
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We will next present the optimal public good provision rules. Let us use the short notation 
 
i
i
i
i l
lc i
c
u
MRS
u
  
for the marginal rate of substitution between the national public good and private 
consumption. Then the following result can be shown: 
 
Proposition 1. The efficient provision of the national public good in Country i is given by (for 
i=1,2) 
 
 1 1
i l l
lcn MRS p p . (12) 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Equation (12) can be compared to the basic Samuelson (1954) rule where we instead have 
i l
lcn MRS p . The modifying factor 1 1  can be seen as the “degree of non-
positionality.” If each person in both countries receives one additional dollar, then their 
relative consumption is held constant. What then remains is the absolute, or the non-
positional, utility effect. For the public good there is by definition no such leakage. This also 
explains why between-country comparisons of private consumption will affect the efficient 
provision of national public goods, despite that these goods (by the assumptions made earlier) 
have no spillover effects across jurisdictions. As such, the policy rule for efficient provision 
of national public goods derived by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) for an economy 
without between-country comparisons, i.e., 1
i l
lcn MRS p , implies under-provision in 
the present context. 
 
As noted by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008), when people care about relative 
consumption, it will matter for the interpretation of the Samuelson rule how people’s marginal 
WTP for the public good is measured. In equation (12) above, 
i
lcMRS reflects an individual’s 
marginal WTP for an increased national public good provision ceteris paribus, i.e., given that 
others’ consumption is held fixed. Alternatively, in the stated preference literature one often 
uses a so-called referendum payment vehicle; see, e.g., Arrow et al. (1993). In that case, 
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people are basically asked whether they would vote yes or no in a referendum implying not 
only a public good increase and that they would have to pay a certain amount (in terms of 
private consumption) for that increase, but also that other people in the society would have to 
pay the same amount. In a conventional model where only absolute consumption matters, it 
does in principle not matter whether peoples’ marginal WTP is elicited ceteris paribus or is 
conditional on that others have to pay too. Yet, when relative consumption matters, this 
distinction is important: When others too have to pay there is an additional benefit to the 
individual, as an individual’s relative consumption increases when others’ consumption 
decreases.  
 
Let us next define a measure of marginal WTP for the national public good, given that all 
others in the individual’s own country will have to pay the same amount for the public good at 
the margin: 
 
i
i i
i
i l
lc i i
c c
u
CMRS
u u
, 
where CMRS can be thought of as the conditional MRS, i.e., individual MRS conditional on 
the fact that all others in the own country will also have to pay the same amount on the margin 
for the public good increase. Based on equation (1) and the definitions of within-country and 
between-country positionality, we obtain 
 
i
i
i
c
i
c
u
u
 and 
j
i
i
c
i
c
u
u
. 
We can then write the relationships between our marginal WTP measures as follows: 
 
 
1
i
i lc
lc
MRS
CMRS . (13) 
 
Using this in equation (12) we obtain the following result: 
 
Corollary 1. The efficient provision of the national public good in Country i can be expressed 
in terms of marginal WTP based on a referendum payment vehicle as follows (for i=1,2): 
 
 
1
1
1 1
i l l
lcn CMRS p p . (14) 
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This result means that the Samuelson rule expressed in terms of marginal WTPs elicited with 
the referendum method, i l
lcn CMRS p , still implies an under-provision of the public good, 
compared to the efficient rule in (14). This can be compared to the corresponding finding in 
the one-country case analyzed by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008). In that case, it 
followed that utilizing a referendum-type payment vehicle implies that we return to the basic 
Samuelson rule, i.e., that the sum of marginal WTPs equals the marginal rate of 
transformation between the national public good and the private consumption good. Here, in 
contrast, although we move in the same direction, the Samuelson rule will still imply an 
under-provision compared to the efficiency rule. The reason is that people in the other country 
will obviously not have to pay for the public good increase; hence a public good increase will 
be accompanied by reduced relative consumption compared to with people in the other 
country. 
 
Let us next consider the efficient provision rule for the global public good, and use the short 
notation 
 
i
i
gi
gc i
c
u
MRS
u
. 
 
Proposition 2. The efficient provision of the global public good is given by 
 
 
1 2 1ggc gcn MRS n MRS p . (15) 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
As can be seen, this efficiency rule is equivalent to the one for the national public good with 
the only difference that we here have a positive marginal WTP for the public good in both 
countries. The logic behind the modifying factor due to relative consumption concerns, i.e., 
1 , is the same as for the national public good.  
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Here too we can define a corresponding marginal WTP measure for the global public good 
when this marginal WTP is elicited under the assumption that all others in the individual’s 
own country also have to pay the same amount at the margin: 
 
 
1
i
i i
i i
g gci
gc i i
c c
u MRS
CMRS
u u
. (16) 
  
This together with equation (15) implies the following result: 
 
Corollary 2. The efficient provision of the global public good can be expressed in terms of 
marginal WTP based on a referendum payment vehicle as follows: 
 
 1 2
1
1
1 1
g g
gc gcn CMRS n CMRS p p . (17) 
 
Hence, the global Samuelson rule expressed in terms of marginal WTPs elicited with the 
referendum method, 
1 2 g
gc gcn CMRS n CMRS p , will imply an under-provision of the 
efficient amount of the global public good.  
 
Yet, with a global public good it makes sense also to consider a developed version of the 
national referendum payment vehicle, as follows: Assume that people are asked to vote yes or 
no to a referendum where a global public good increase is associated with a consumption 
decrease for all people, i.e., in both countries. The corresponding marginal WTP measure can 
then be expressed as 
 
 ,
1
i i
i i i j
i i i
g g gci
g c i i i i
c c c c
v u MRS
GMRS
v u u u
,  (18) 
 
where GMRS can be thought of as the globally conditional MRS, i.e., individual MRS 
conditional on the fact that all others globally will also have to pay the same amount at the 
margin for the public good increase. By combining equations (15) and (18), we obtain: 
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Corollary 3. The efficient provision of the global public good can be expressed in terms of 
marginal WTP based on a global referendum payment vehicle as follows: 
 
 
1 2
, ,
g
g c g cn GMRS n GMRS p . (19) 
 
Corollary 3 thus implies that the Samuelson rule expressed in terms of  marginal WTP based 
on a global referendum payment vehicle, such that all people in both countries will have to 
pay for a public good increase, is identical to the efficient rule. 
 
 
4. Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium 
 
So far we have solely been concerned with the Pareto efficient allocation. However, since 
national governments typically play a fundamental role for the provision of national as well as 
global public goods, a natural next step is to consider the behavior of each government based 
on a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, such that each national government contributes to the 
public goods while treating the contributions made by the other government as exogenous at 
the equilibrium. Since we focus solely on economic efficiency in the present paper, and hence 
do not analyze distributional issues, we also (implicitly) assume that each government can 
raise lump-sum taxes in order to finance the public good provision. The corresponding 
Lagrangean for Country i can then be written 
 
i i i i l i g iU y nc p l p g , (20) 
 
where i  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the national resource constraint. The 
associated first-order conditions with respect to the private consumption, the contribution to 
the global public good, and the provision of the national public good, respectively, in Country 
i are given by: 
 
 0i i
i i i
c c
u u n , (21) 
 0
i i g
gu p , (22) 
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 0i
i i l
l
u p . (23) 
 
 By combining (21) and (23), we immediately obtain the following result: 
 
Proposition 3. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium implies the following rule for provision 
of a national public good in Country i (for i=1,2) 
 
 1i llcn MRS p , (24) 
 
implying an under-provision compared to the efficient provision rule in Proposition 1.  
 
The derivation of equation (24) is analogous to the derivation of equation (12). Note that this 
under-provision result holds despite the fact that the government takes into account relative 
consumption effects (within the country), and also despite the fact that we are dealing with a 
national public good, i.e., a good that individuals in Country j do not derive any utility from. 
The intuition for the under-provision is instead based on the fact that the government in 
Country i will not take into account that the reduced private consumption in Country i that 
will follow from increased public provision implies a benefit to individuals in Country j, i.e., a 
benefit that is not taken into account in the Nash equilibrium. 
 
We can also note that a government that wants to implement the Nash equilibrium can do so 
simply by applying the Samuelson rule expressed in terms of marginal WTPs based on a 
referendum payment vehicle, i.e., a payment vehicle such that individual WTP is measured 
conditional on that all others in the individual’s home country will also have to pay the same 
amount for the public good increase, such that 
 
 i l
lcn CMRS p . (25) 
 
Finally, turning to the national contribution to the global public good, we combine equations 
(21) and (22) to obtain the following result: 
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Proposition 4. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium implies the following rule for 
contribution to a global public good in Country i (i=1,2): 
 
 1
i g
gcn MRS p , (26) 
 
implying an under-provision compared to the efficient provision rule in Proposition 2.  
 
Equation (26) is derived in the same general way as equation (15) above. By comparing (15) 
with (26), we can conclude that this under-provision result follows for two different reasons. 
First, and most straightforward, there is an under-provision due to free-riding, i.e., each 
country will not take into account the benefit that the public good causes to people in the other 
country. Second, there is a benefit through the same mechanism as described above for the 
national public good, namely that Country i will not take into account that the reduction in the 
domestic private consumption needed to finance the contribution to the global public good 
leads to increased relative consumption in Country j, a benefit of public provision that is not 
taken into account in the Nash equilibrium. As a consequence, the under-provision problem 
associated with national contributions to global public goods is more severe when individuals 
have positional preferences than in a standard model where utility is determined solely by the 
absolute consumption. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have derived Pareto efficient rules for the provision of national as well as 
global public goods in a two-country world where each individual cares about relative private 
consumption in both a national (compared to other people in the same country) and 
international (compared to people in other countries) perspective. We have also compared the 
policy rules for efficient provision with those that follow in a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium, which is based on the assumption that each national government treats the public 
provision by the other country as exogenous.  
 
We would like to emphasize two conclusions from the analysis. First, the results show that not 
only global public goods are under-provided in Nash equilibrium (as in standard models 
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without positional concerns); national governments also systematically under-provide national 
public goods in Nash equilibrium under relative consumption concerns. Furthermore, this 
holds despite our assumption that national public goods do not spill over across jurisdictions. 
The intuition is, instead, that an individual country does not take into account that the 
reduction in the domestic private consumption needed to finance the increased public 
provision leads to increased relative consumption in other countries.  
 
Second, and for the same basic reason, the under-provision problem associated with global 
public goods is more severe here than in the absence of relative consumption concerns. In 
light of the recent empirical evidence discussed in the introduction, which suggests that 
between-country comparisons have increased in importance during the last decades, it is 
tempting to be provocative and argue that globalization in combination with relative 
consumption concerns have weakened the national incentives to contribute to global public 
goods. Yet, we settle for a more modest conclusion that is fully supported by our analysis: 
that relative consumption concerns based on between-country comparisons imply under-
provision of global public goods in Nash equilibrium even in the absence of the (well 
documented) free-rider problem associated with the public goods per se. 
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Appendix 
 
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 
 
Let us start with Proposition 1. Combining equations (7) and (8) gives 
 
 
1 1 2
2 2 1
1 1 1
2 2 2
c c c
c c c
u u u
u u u
, (A1) 
 
while combining equations (7) and (10) implies 
 
 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 / l
c c c l
u u u nu p . (A2) 
 
Substituting (A1) i.nto (A2), we have 
 
 
1 1 1 2
1 1 1
2 2 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 2
2 2 2
l c c c
l c c c
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u u u u
n u u u
p u u u
. (A3) 
 
Reorganizing equation (A3) and using the MRS definition implies 
  
 
1 2
1 1 1
2 11 2
2
1 1
1 1 2
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2 21 2
2
1
1
1
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u
. (A4) 
Using finally, through equation (1) and the positionality definitions, that 
 
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
c c
c c
u u
u u
 and 
2 1
1 2
1 2
1 2
c c
c c
u u
u u
, 
we obtain equation (12) in Proposition 1. 
 
Turning to Proposition 2, we combine equations (7) and (9) to derive 
 
21 
 
 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 2g
g gc c c
u u u p u u n . (A5) 
 
It is easy to show from the positionality definitions and (A1) that 1 2
1 2/
c c
u u . Substituting 
into equation (A5) and collecting terms implies 
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. (A6) 
 
Using the MRS and positionality definitions then implies equation (15) in Proposition 2. 
 
 
